By John Wear: President
Franklin D. Roosevelt revealed his antagonism toward Germany when he
wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson on Aug. 26, 1944: “Too many
people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a
whole are not responsible for what has taken place—that only a few Nazi
leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The
German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole
nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies
of modern civilization.”1
President
Roosevelt in this communication ignores the existence of a German
opposition to National Socialism which frequently manifested itself
during its rule and which culminated in the unsuccessful conspiracy to
assassinate Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944. More importantly, Roosevelt
tried to place the entire blame for starting World War II on the German
people as a whole. As we have seen, Germany and its people were not
primarily responsible for starting World War II. In this chapter we will
show that, in fact, it was President Roosevelt and the other Allied
leaders who were engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies
of modern civilization.
FDR Conspires to Allow ‘Surprise’ Attack at Pearl Harbor
By
the closing months of 1941, the United States was intercepting and
breaking within a matter of hours almost every code produced by Japan.2
The Army Signal Corps had broken the top Japanese diplomatic code known
as PURPLE in August 1940. The United States was thus able to decipher
and read all diplomatic messages sent between Tokyo and Japanese
officials all over the world. Copies of these and other intercepted
messages were circulated to all key administration officials in
Washington, D.C. These messages, known as MAGIC, revealed much important
information to the recipients.
The
United States sent duplicate code machines to London, Singapore, and
the Philippine Islands to keep the British and our Far East forces
informed. Hawaii never received a duplicate code machine. Therefore, our
government in Washington, D.C. had a far greater than normal
responsibility to make certain that Hawaii was properly informed and
alerted.3
However, the two United States commanders at Pearl Harbor, Rear Adm.
Husband Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter Short, were never informed of the
intercepted Japanese messages. The Roosevelt administration did not
disclose these intercepted Japanese messages to Kimmel and Short because
it wanted the Japanese to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
In
the last week of November 1941, Roosevelt knew that an attack by the
Japanese in the Pacific was imminent. Roosevelt warned William Bullitt
against traveling across the Pacific, “I am expecting the Japs to attack
any time now, probably within the next three or four days.”4
Roosevelt and his administration knew this based on the intercepted
Japanese messages. This information should have been given to the
commanders at Pearl Harbor to enable them to prepare for and thwart the
Japanese attack.
The
war was only 10 days old before some Congressmen questioned why
America’s military leaders at Pearl Harbor had been unprepared for the
Japanese attack. Fearing that a congressional investigation would harm
both his political future and the war effort, Roosevelt appointed a
five-man board of inquiry headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of
the U.S. Supreme Court. In order to maintain military secrecy, the
Roberts Commission did not examine or discuss any of the Japanese naval
intercepts. The Roberts Commission’s report concluded that the Pearl
Harbor attack was successful due to failures and errors of judgment by
Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short. They were both charged with dereliction of
duty. President Roosevelt approved the Roberts Commission’s report on
Jan. 24, 1942.5
A
number of investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack followed the Roberts
Commission report. Most of these investigations have been attempts to
suppress, mislead, or confuse those who seek the truth. Facts and files
have been withheld so as to reveal only those items of information which
benefit the Roosevelt administration.6
Investigations
conducted by the Army and Navy boards did eventually exonerate Adm.
Kimmel and Gen. Short from derelictions of duty and failures to act
which were “the effective causes” of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In
its report released on Aug. 29, 1945, the Navy Court of Inquiry said
that Adm. Harold Stark had “failed to display the sound judgment
expected of him” in not transmitting to Adm. Kimmel in 1941 important
information. This important information included warning Kimmel “that an
attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.”7
One
commentator has noted that those who maintained secrecy, failed to
remember, or testified on behalf of the administration in the Pearl
Harbor investigations rose very quickly to high places. These people
include Gen. George Marshall, who was made a permanent five-star
general, Col. Walter Bedell Smith, who became a three-star general,
Alben Barkley, who became Vice-President under Harry Truman, Sen. Scott
Lucas, who became the Senate majority leader, and John W. Murphy and
Samuel H. Kaufman, who were both appointed to lifetime Federal
judgeships. On the other hand, virtually no one who testified in the
various hearings as to the facts that were damaging to the Roosevelt
administration and their superiors was ever promoted or rewarded.8
None
of the Pearl Harbor investigations were able to prove definitively that
the Roosevelt administration knew beforehand of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. This is because key evidence began to be concealed as
early as Dec. 11, 1941. On this date Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes, the Navy’s
Director of Communications, consigned the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese
military and diplomatic intercepts and the relevant directives to Navy
vaults. In August 1945, the Navy blocked public access to the pre-Pearl
Harbor intercepts by classifying the documents TOP SECRET. When the
congressional investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack began on Nov.
15, 1945, only diplomatic messages were released. None of the details of
the interception, decoding, or dissemination of the pre-Pearl Harbor
naval messages were introduced into evidence.9
The
Freedom of Information Act has since been used by Robert Stinnett to
release information not available in previous Pearl Harbor
investigations. Stinnett, a veteran of the Pacific War, conducted 17
years of research involving more than 200,000 documents and interviews.
Stinnett concludes that: 1) the United States provoked Japan’s attack on
Pearl Harbor; 2) U.S. intelligence knew that the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor was coming; and 3) Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were deprived
of this intelligence.10
Stinnett
states: “Seven Japanese naval broadcasts intercepted between November
28 and December 6 [1941] confirmed that Japan intended to start the war
and that it would begin at Pearl Harbor. The evidence that poured into
American intelligence stations is overpowering. All the broadcasts have
one common denominator: none ever reached Admiral Kimmel.”11
Adm.
Robert A. Theobald, who was in the port of Pearl Harbor when the
Japanese attacked, conducted extensive research for many years into the
Pearl Harbor attack. Theobald concludes that President Roosevelt forced
Japan to war by unrelenting diplomatic-economic pressure. Also, Theobald
concludes that Roosevelt enticed Japan to initiate hostilities with its
surprise attack of the Pacific fleet in Hawaiian waters. By withholding
information from Adm. Kimmel that would have caused Kimmel to render
the attack impossible, Theobald states that President Roosevelt brought
war to the United States on Dec. 7, 1941. There would have been no Pearl
Harbor attack if MAGIC had been made available to the Hawaiian
commanders.12
Adm. Theobald lists the following facts to show that the Pearl Harbor attack was in accord with President Roosevelt’s plans:
1.
President Roosevelt and his military and naval advisors were well aware
that Japan invariably started her wars with a surprise attack
synchronized closely with her delivery of the Declaration of War;
2.
In October, 1940, the President stated that, if war broke out in the
Pacific, Japan would commit the overt act which would bring the United
States into war;
3.
The Pacific Fleet, against contrary naval advice, was retained in
Hawaii by order of the President for the alleged reason that the Fleet,
so located, would exert a restrictive effect upon Japanese aggression in
the Far East;
4.
The Fleet in Hawaii was neither powerful enough nor in the necessary
strategic position to influence Japan’s diplomatic decisions, which
could only be accomplished by the stationing of an adequate naval force
in Far Eastern waters;
5.
Before the Fleet could operate at any distance from Pearl Harbor, its
train (tankers, supply and repair vessels) would have had to be
tremendously increased in strength—facts that would not escape the
notice of the experienced Japanese spies in Hawaii;
6.
President Roosevelt gave unmistakable evidence, in March, 1941, that he
was not greatly concerned with the Pacific Fleet’s effects upon
Japanese diplomatic decisions, when he authorized the weakening of that
Fleet, already inferior to that of Japan, by the detachment of three
battleships, one aircraft carrier, four light cruisers, and eighteen
destroyers for duty in the Atlantic—a movement which would immediately
be detected by Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone;
7.
The successful crippling of the Pacific Fleet was the only surprise
operation which promised the Japanese Navy sufficiently large results to
justify the risk of heavy losses from land-based air attacks if the
surprised failed;
8.
Such an operation against the Fleet in Hawaii was attended with far
greater chances of success, especially from the surprise standpoint, and
far less risk of heavy losses than a similar attack against the Fleet
based in U.S. West Coast ports;
9.
The retention of the Fleet in Hawaii, especially after its reduction in
strength in March, 1941, could serve only one possible purpose, an
invitation to a surprise Japanese attack;
10.
The denial to the Hawaiian Commanders of all knowledge of Magic was
vital to the plan for enticing Japan to deliver a surprise attack upon
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, because, as late as Saturday, December 6,
Admiral Kimmel could have caused the attack to be cancelled by taking
his Fleet to sea and disappearing beyond land-based human ken.13
Adm.
Theobald’s conclusions are reinforced by Adm. William F. Halsey, who
was one of three senior commanders of the Pacific Fleet serving under
Adm. Kimmel. Adm. Halsey states: “. . . I did not know then of any of
the pertinent ‘Magic Messages.’ All our intelligence pointed to an
attack by Japan against the Philippines or the southern areas in Malaya
or the Dutch East Indies. While Pearl Harbor was considered and not
ruled out, the mass of evidence made available to us pointed in another
direction. Had we known of Japan’s minute and continued interest in the
exact location and movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor, as indicated
in the ‘Magic Messages,’ it is only logical that we would have
concentrated our thought on meeting the practical certainty of an attack
on Pearl Harbor.”14
Adm.
Kimmel was dumbfounded that the MAGIC messages were never disclosed to
him. Kimmel states that if he had all of the important information then
available to the Navy Department, he would have gone to sea with his
fleet and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.15 Adm. Kimmel concludes in regard to the Pearl Harbor attacks:
Again
and again in my mind I have reviewed the events that preceded the
Japanese attack, seeking to determine if I was unjustified in drawing
from the orders, directives and information that were forwarded to me
the conclusions that I did. The fact that I then thought and now think
my conclusions were sound when based upon the information I received,
has sustained me during the years that have passed since the first
Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor.
When
the information available in Washington was disclosed to me I was
appalled. Nothing in my experience of nearly forty-two years of service
in the Navy had prepared me for the actions of the highest officials in
our government which denied this vital information to the Pearl Harbor
commanders.
If
those in authority wished to engage in power politics, the least that
they should have done was to advise their naval and military commanders
what they were endeavoring to accomplish. To utilize the Pacific Fleet
and the Army forces at Pearl Harbor as a lure for a Japanese attack
without advising the commander-in-chief of the fleet and the commander
of the Army base at Hawaii is something I am wholly unable to
comprehend.16
Adm. James O. Richardson agrees with Kimmel’s assessment. Rich- ardson wrote after the war:
I
consider that, after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest
of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt. . . . I consider “Betty” Stark,
in failing to ensure that Kimmel was furnished with all the information
available from the breaking Japanese dispatches, to have been to a
marked degree professionally negligent in carrying out his duties as
Chief of Naval Operations.
This
offense was compounded, since in writing he had assured the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet twice (both myself and
Kimmel) that the Commander-in-Chief was “being kept advised on all
matters within his own [Stark’s] knowledge” and “you may rest assured
that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire
it along.”17
The
U.S. government and military possessed solid intelligence before Dec.
7, 1941, concerning Japanese plans to attack the United States.
According to the Army Pearl Harbor Board:
Information
from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential
enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States
and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in
November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete
disclosure of Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to
know what . . . Japanese potential moves . . . were scheduled . . .
against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of
essential facts as to the enemy’s intentions. . . . This information
showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely
imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity of resorting to every
trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to
give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.18
The
Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was no surprise to the Roosevelt
administration. Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were denied the vital
information of a planned Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor because
Roosevelt wanted an excuse to get the United States into the war.
Roosevelt made Kimmel and Short the scapegoats for the Pearl Harbor
tragedy. This is consistent with Franklin Roosevelt’s complex and
devious nature. Roosevelt admitted to Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau six months after Pearl Harbor: “You know I am a juggler, and I
never let my right hand know what my left hand does . . . and
furthermore I am willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help
win the war.”19
FDR Conspires to Force the U.S. to Enter World War II
Numerous
historians and political leaders conclude that Roosevelt conspired to
force the United States into war. Historian Harry Elmer Barnes
summarizes President Roosevelt’s efforts to involve the United States in
World War II:
Roosevelt
“lied the United States into war.” He went as far as he dared in
illegal efforts, such as convoying vessels carrying munitions, to
provoke Germany and Italy to make war on the United States. Failing in
this, he turned to a successful attempt to enter the War through the
back door of Japan. He rejected repeated and sincere Japanese proposals
that even Hull admitted protected all the vital interests of the United
States in the Far East, by his economic strangulation in the summer of
1941 forced the Japanese into an attack on Pearl Harbor, took steps to
prevent the Pearl Harbor commanders, General Short and Admiral Kimmel,
from having their own decoding facilities to detect a Japanese attack,
kept Short and Kimmel from receiving the decoded Japanese intercepts
that Washington picked up and indicated that war might come at any
moment, and ordered General Marshall and Admiral Stark not to send any
warning to Short and Kimmel before noon on December 7th, when Roosevelt knew that any warning sent would be too late to avert the Japanese attack at 1:00 P.M., Washington time.20
William
Henry Chamberlain also concludes that Roosevelt guided America into the
war. Chamberlain writes: “The war with Germany was also very largely
the result of the initiative of the Roosevelt Administration. The
destroyer deal, the lend-lease bill, the freezing of Axis assets, the
injection of the American Navy, with much secrecy and doubletalk, into
the Battle of the Atlantic: these and many similar actions were obvious
departures from neutrality, even though a Neutrality Act, which the
President had sworn to uphold, was still on the statute books.”21
Chamberlain goes on to state that America’s entry into World War II was based on illusions:
America’s
Second Crusade was a product of illusions which are already bankrupt.
It was an illusion that that the United States was at any time in danger
of invasion by Nazi Germany. It was an illusion that Hitler was bent on
the destruction of the British Empire. It was an illusion that China
was capable of becoming a strong, friendly, western-oriented power in
the Far East. It was an illusion that a powerful Soviet Union in a
weakened and impoverished Eurasia would be a force for peace,
conciliation, stability, and international co-operation. It was an
illusion that the evils and dangers associated with totalitarianism
could be eliminated by giving unconditional support to one form of
totalitarianism against another. It was an illusion that a combination
of appeasement and personal charm could melt away designs of conquest
and domination which were deeply rooted in Russian history and Communist
philosophy.22
Historian
Klaus Fischer writes that Roosevelt implemented numerous actions in
1941 that prepared the United States to enter World War II:
Roosevelt’s
actions against both Germany and Japan were positively provocative,
including the previously mentioned programs of cash and carry,
lend-lease, neutrality zones, restoring conscription, increased defense
appropriations, and secret war plans. In March 1941 Roosevelt informed
the British that they could have their ships repaired in American docks,
and that same month the president ordered the seizure of all Axis
vessels in American ports. On April 10, Roosevelt extended the security
zone all the way to the eastern coast of Greenland, negotiating the use
of military bases on the island with a Danish official who did not have
approval from his home government. If we add the various economic
sanctions the president imposed on Japan, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that Roosevelt was preparing the nation for war.23
Clare
Boothe Luce surprised many people at the Republican Convention in 1944
by saying that Roosevelt “lied the American people into war because he
could not lead them into it.” Once this statement proved to be true, the
Roosevelt supporters ceased to deny it. Instead, they said Roosevelt
was forced to lie to save his country and the rest of the world.
Sir
Oliver Lyttelton, the British Minister of Productions in Churchill’s
cabinet, confirms that the United States was not forced into war.
Speaking before the American Chamber of Commerce in London in 1944,
Lyttelton stated: “Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at
Pearl Harbor. . . . It is a travesty of history to ever say America was
forced into war.”24
On
Dec. 8, 1941, Rep. Hamilton Fish made the first speech in Congress
asking for a declaration of war against Japan. Fish later said that if
he had known what Roosevelt had been doing to provoke Japan to attack,
he never would have asked for a declaration of war. Fish states:
FDR
deliberately goaded Japan into war. . . . Roosevelt was the main
instigator and firebrand to light the fuse of war, abetted by the five
members of his war cabinet. They were all sure that the Japanese would
start the war by an undeclared strategic attack.
Roosevelt,
through his numerous campaign pledges and also by the plank of the
Democratic national platform against intervention, had tied himself in
unbreakable peace knots. There was only one way out—to provoke Germany
or Japan into attacking us. He tried in every way possible to incite the
Germans to attack, but to no avail. The convoy of ships, and the
shoot-at-sight order, were open and brazen efforts by the president to
take the country into war against Germany, but Hitler avoided the lure.
The
delay and virtual refusal to inform our Hawaiian commander is
inconceivable, except as a part of a deceitful and concerted scheme of
silence. . . . The tragedy of Pearl Harbor rests with FDR, not only
because of the infamous war ultimatum, but for not making sure that
Kimmel and Short were notified of the Japanese answer to the ultimatum.25
If
Roosevelt’s secret policies had been known, the public demand for his
impeachment would probably have been unstoppable. Fish states: “If the
American people had known that they were deliberately tricked into a
foreign war by Roosevelt in defiance of all his promises and pledges,
there would have been political bombs exploding all over the United
States, including demands for his resignation or impeach- ment.”26 Fish concludes: “Roosevelt had the opportunity to be a great peacemaker. Instead he chose to be a disastrous war maker.”27
Even
biographers friendly to Roosevelt admit that until the last year when
he was weighed down by physical illness, Roosevelt had never been as
happy as during World War II. After the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt
wrote a letter to George VI: “A truly mighty meeting. . . . As for Mr.
Churchill and myself, I need not tell you that we make a perfectly
matched team in harness and out—and incidentally we had lots of fun
together, as we always do.”28
USSR Conspires to Foment WWII & Infiltrate U.S. Government
Stalin
adopted three Five Year Plans beginning in 1927 designed to make the
Soviet Union by far the greatest military power in the world. Stalin
also conspired to start a major war in Europe by drawing Great Britain
and France into war against Germany and other countries. Stalin’s plan
was to eliminate one enemy with the hands of another. If Germany entered
into a war with Great Britain and France, other countries would enter
into the war and great destruction would follow. The Soviet Union could
then invade Europe and easily take over the entire continent.
Stalin
first attempted to start a major war in Europe in 1936 during the civil
war in Spain. Stalin’s political agents, propagandists, diplomats, and
spies in Spain all screamed in outrage that children were dying in Spain
while Great Britain and France did nothing. However, Stalin’s agents
were not able to spread the war beyond Spain’s borders. By the end of
1938, Stalin stopped all anti-Hitler propaganda to calm Hitler and to
encourage him to attack Poland.
Stalin
eventually forced war in Europe with the signing of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. British and French delegations had arrived
in Moscow on Aug. 11, 1939, to discuss joint action against Germany.
During the course of the talks, British and French delegates told the
Soviets that if Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France would
declare war against Germany. This was the information that Stalin needed
to know. On Aug. 19, 1939, Stalin stopped the talks with Great Britain
and France, and told the German ambassador in Moscow that he wanted to
reach an agreement with Germany. Germany and the Soviet Union then
signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, which resulted in the
destruction and division of Poland.29
The
Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement is remarkable in that Hitler repeatedly
stated he hated communism and did not trust the leaders of the Soviet
Union. Hitler writes in Mein Kampf:
It
must never be forgotten that the present rulers of Russia are
blood-stained criminals, that here we have the dregs of humanity which,
favored by the circumstances of a tragic moment, overran a great State,
degraded and extirpated millions of educated people out of sheer
blood-lust, and that now for nearly ten years they have ruled with such a
savage tyranny as was never known before. It must not be forgotten that
these rulers belong to a people in whom the most bestial cruelty is
allied with a capacity for artful mendacity and believes itself today
more than ever called to impose its sanguinary despotism on the rest of
the world. It must not be forgotten that the international Jew, who is
today the absolute master of Russia, does not look upon Germany as an
ally but as a State condemned to the same doom as Russia. One does not
form an alliance with a partner whose only aim is the destruction of his
fellow partner. Above all, one does not enter into alliances with
people for whom no treaty is sacred; because they do not move about this
earth as men of honor and sincerity but as the representatives of lies
and deception, thievery and plunder and robbery. The man who thinks that
he can bind himself by treaty with parasites is like the tree that
believes it can form a profitable bargain with the ivy that surrounds
it.30
Hitler also states in Mein Kampf:
“Therefore the fact of forming an alliance with Russia would be the
signal for a new war. And the result of that would be the end of
Germany.”31
Hitler
repeated his distrust of the Soviet Union in a conversation on March 3,
1938, with British Ambassador Nevile Henderson. Hitler stated in this
conversation that any limitations on arms depended on the Soviet Union.
Hitler noted that the problem was rendered particularly difficult “by
the fact that one could place as much confidence in the faith in
treaties of a barbarous creature like the Soviet Union as in the
comprehension of mathematical formulae by a savage. Any agreement with
the U.S.S.R. was quite worthless.” Hitler added that it was impossible,
for example, to have faith in any Soviet agreement not to use poison
gas.32
These statements by Hitler in Mein Kampf and to Nevile Henderson were prescient.
Stalin had been conspiring to take over all of Europe ever since the
1920s. Stalin and the Soviet Union could not be trusted to uphold any
peace agreement. However, Hitler decided to enter into the
Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement because Hitler was desperate to end the
atrocities being committed against the ethnic Germans in Poland. Hitler
was hoping that the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement would prevent Great
Britain and France from declaring war against Germany.33
Hitler
also signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement because the negotiations
that had been ongoing between Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
Union had taken on a threatening character for Germany. Hitler was
confronted with the alternative of being encircled by this massive
alliance coalition or ending it via diplomatic channels. The
Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact prevented Germany from being
encircled by these three powers.34
Stalin
stayed out of the war in Europe he had conspired to instigate. Stalin
kept the war in Europe going by supplying much needed supplies to
Germany. However, Hitler’s swift victory over France prevented the
massive destruction in Europe Stalin had hoped for. Molotov was sent to
Germany in November 1940 to announce the Soviet Union’s new territorial
demands in Europe. These new territorial demands effectively ended the
Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. Hitler was forced to launch a preemptive
attack on June 22, 1941, to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering all
of Europe.
The
Soviet war effort in the European theater of World War II was enormous.
Most historians underestimate the incredible power of the Soviet
military. As historian Norman Davies states: “. . . the Soviet war
effort was so overwhelming that impartial historians in the future are
unlikely to rate the British and American contribution to the European
theatre as much more than a supporting role. The proportions were not
‘Fifty-fifty’, as many imply when talking of the final onslaught on
Nazi Germany from East and West. Sooner or later people will have to
adjust to the fact that the Soviet role was enormous and the Western
role was respectable but modest.”35
A
crucial factor that prevented the Soviet takeover of Europe was the more
than 400,000 non-German Europeans who volunteered to fight on the
Eastern Front. Combined with 600,000 German troops, the 1,000,000 man
Waffen-SS represented the first truly pan-European army to ever exist.
The heroism of these non-German volunteers who joined the Waffen-SS
prevented the planned Soviet conquest of Europe. In this regard,
Waffen-SS Gen. Leon Degrelle states:
If
the Waffen-SS had not existed, Europe would have been overrun entirely
by the Soviets by 1944. They would have reached Paris long before the
Americans. Waffen-SS heroism stopped the Soviet juggernaut at Moscow,
Cherkov, Cherkassy and Tarnopol. The Soviets lost more than 12 months.
Without SS resistance the Soviets would have been in Normandy before
Eisenhower. The people showed deep gratitude to the young men who
sacrificed their lives.36
The
Soviet Union also conspired to have Japan attack the United States.
Harry Dexter White, who was later proven to be a Soviet agent, carried
out a mission to provoke Japan into war with the United States. When
Secretary of State Cordell Hull allowed the peacemakers in Roosevelt’s
administration to put together a modus vivendi
that had real potential, White drafted a 10-point proposal that the
Japanese were certain to reject. White passed a copy of his proposal to
Hull, and this final American offer—the so-called “Hull note”—was
presented to the Japanese on Nov. 26, 1941.37
The
Hull note, which was based on two memoranda from White, was a
declaration of war as far as the Japanese were concerned. The Hull note
destroyed any possible peace settlement with the Japanese, and led to
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In this regard, historian John
Koster writes:
Harry
Dexter White, acting under orders from Soviet intelligence, pulled the
strings by which Cordell Hull and [State Department expert on Far
Eastern Affairs] Stanley Hornbeck handed the Japanese an ultimatum that
was tantamount to a declaration of war—when both the Japanese cabinet
and the U.S. military were desperately eager for peace. . . . Harry
Dexter White knew exactly what he was doing. The man himself remains a
mystery, but the documents speak for themselves. Harry Dexter White gave
us Pearl Harbor.38
The
Soviets had also planted numerous other agents in the Roosevelt
administration. For example, Harold Glasser, a member of Morgenthau’s
Treasury staff, provided intelligence from the War Department and the
White House to the Soviets. Glasser’s reports were deemed so important
by the NKVD that 74 reports generated from his material went directly to
Stalin. One historian writes of the Soviet infiltration of the U.S.
government and its effect on Roosevelt:
These
spies, plus the hundreds in other U.S. agencies at the time, including
the military and the OSS, permeated the administration in Washington,
and, ultimately, the White House, surrounding FDR. He was basically in
the Soviet’s pocket. He admired Stalin, sought his favor. Right or
wrong, he thought the Soviet Union indispensable in the war, crucial to
bringing world peace after it, and he wanted the Soviets handled with
kid gloves. FDR was star struck. The Russians hardly could have done
better if he was a Soviet spy.39
The
opening of the Soviet archives in 1995 revealed that more than 300
communist members or supporters had infiltrated the American government.
Working in Lend-Lease, the Treasury Department, the State Department,
the office of the president, the office of the vice president, and even
American intelligence operations, these spies constantly tried to shift
U.S. policy in a pro-Soviet direction. During World War II several of
these Soviet spies were well-positioned to influence American policy.
Especially at the Tehran and Yalta meetings toward the end of World War
II, the Soviet spies were able to influence Roosevelt to make huge
concessions to the Soviet Union.40
CHURCHILL Conspires to Perpetuate WWII, Destroy Germany
Hitler
had never wanted war with Great Britain. To Hitler, Great Britain was
the natural ally of Germany and the nation he admired most. Hitler had
no ambitions against Britain or her Empire, and all of the captured
records solidly bear this out.41
Hitler
had also never planned for a world war. British historian A.J.P. Taylor
shatters the myth of a great German military buildup:
In
1938-39, the last peacetime year, Germany spent on armament about 15%
of her gross national product. The British proportion was almost exactly
the same. German expenditure on armaments was actually cut down after
Munich and remained at this lower level, so that British production of
aeroplanes, for example, was way ahead of German by 1940. When war broke
out in 1939, Germany had 1,450 modern fighter planes and 800 bombers;
Great Britain and France had 950 fighters and 1,300 bombers. The Germans
had 3,500 tanks; Great Britain and France had 3,850. In each case
Allied intelligence estimated German strength at more than twice the
true figure. As usual, Hitler was thought to have planned and prepared
for a great war. In fact, he had not.42
Taylor further states that Hitler was not intending or anticipating a major war:
He
was not projecting a major war; hence it did not matter that Germany
was not equipped for one. Hitler deliberately ruled out the “rearmament
in depth” which was pressed on him by his technical advisors. He was not
interested in preparing for a long war against the Great Powers. He
chose instead “rearmament in width”—a frontline army without reserves,
adequate only for a quick strike. Under Hitler’s direction, Germany was
equipped to win the war of nerves—the only war he understood and liked;
she was not equipped to conquer Europe. . . . In considering German
armament we escape from the mystic regions of Hitler’s psychology and
find an answer in the realm of fact. The answer is clear. The state of
German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not
contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.43
Hitler
was eager to make peace once Great Britain and France had declared war
against Germany. Hitler confided to his inner circle: “If we on our side
avoid all acts of war, the whole business will evaporate. As soon as we
sink a ship and they have sizeable casualties, the war party over there
will gain strength.”44
Hitler made a peace offer on Oct. 6, 1939, that was quickly rejected.
No doubt the leaders of the Soviet Union, who wanted a general European
war, were relieved by the quick rejection of Hitler’s offer.
Hitler
dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance even when Germany was at war with
Great Britain. Hitler biographer Alan Bullock states: “Even during the
war Hitler persisted in believing that an alliance with Germany . . .
was in Britain’s own interest, continually expressed his regret that the
British had been so stupid as not to see this, and never gave up the
hope that he would be able to overcome their obstinacy and persuade them
to accept his view.”45
Germany’s
offensive against Dunkirk was halted by Hitler’s order on May 24, 1940.
German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt insists that his hands were
tied by Hitler’s instructions. Hitler talked to von Rundstedt and two
key men of his staff, Gens. Georg von Sodenstern and Guenther
Blumentritt. As Gen. Blumentritt tells the story:
He
[Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British
Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that
Britain had brought into the world. . . . He said that all he wanted
from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the
Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but
not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if
she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.46
Hitler
told his friend Frau Troost: “The blood of every single Englishman is
too valuable to be shed. Our two people belong together, racially and
traditionally—this is and always has been my aim even if our generals
can’t grasp it.”47
Hitler
states in his Testament on Feb. 26, 1945: “Churchill was quite unable
to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by
refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and
ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We
ought to have been able to make them realize that the acceptance by
them of the German hegemony established in Europe, a state of affairs to
the implementation of which they had always been opposed, but which I
had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable
advantages.”48
Having
been given the gift of Dunkirk by Hitler, Churchill refused to
acknowledge it. Churchill instead described the evacuation of British
troops off the beaches of Dunkirk as a heroic miracle accomplished by
the British navy. Churchill became even more bellicose in his
determination to continue the war.49
Hitler’s
desire to preserve the British Empire was expressed on another occasion
when the military fortunes of the Allies were at their lowest ebb. When
France appealed for an armistice, von Ribbentrop gave the following
summary of Hitler’s attitude toward Great Britain in a strictly private
talk with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano:
He
[Ribbentrop] said that in the Fuehrer’s opinion the existence of the
British Empire as an element of stability and social order in the world
is very useful. In the present state of affairs it would be impossible
to replace it with another, similar organization. Therefore, the
Fuehrer—as he has also recently stated in public—does not desire the
destruction of the British Empire. He asks that England renounce some of
its possessions and recognize the fait accompli. On these conditions Hitler would be prepared to come to an agreement.50
After
Dunkirk, Ribbentrop wrote that Hitler was enthused with making a quick
peace with England. Hitler outlined the peace terms he was prepared to
offer the British: “It will only be a few points, and the first point is
that nothing must be done between England and Germany which would in
any way violate the prestige of Great Britain. Secondly, Great Britain
must give us back one or two of our old colonies. That is the only thing
we want.”51
On
June 25, 1940, Hitler telephoned Joseph Goebbels to lay out the terms
of an agreement with Great Britain. Goebbels wrote in his diary:
The
Fuehrer . . . believes that the [British Empire] must be preserved if
at all possible. For if it collapses, then we shall not inherit it, but
foreign and even hostile powers take it over. But if England will have
it no other way, then she must be beaten to her knees. The Fuehrer,
however, would be agreeable to peace on the following basis: England out
of Europe, colonies and mandates returned. Reparations for what was
stolen from us after the World War. . . .52
Hitler
took the initiative to end the war after the fall of France in June
1940. In a victory speech on July 19, 1940, Hitler declared that it had
never been his intention to destroy or even harm the British Empire.
Hitler made a general peace offer in the following words:
In
this hour I feel it to be my duty before my conscience to appeal once
more to reason and commonsense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I
consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the
vanquished, begging favors, but the victor, speaking in the name of
reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on.53
This
speech was followed by private diplomatic overtures to Great Britain
through Sweden, the United States, and the Vatican. There is no question
that Hitler was eager to end the war. But Churchill was in the war with
the objective of destroying Germany. Churchill was not concerned with
saving the British Empire from destruction. British Foreign Secretary
Lord Halifax also wanted the war to continue, and brushed aside what he
called Hitler’s “summons to capitulate at his will.”54 Hitler’s peace offer was officially rejected on July 22, 1940.55
Alan
Clarke, defense aid to Margaret Thatcher, believes that only
Churchill’s obsession with Hitler and “single-minded determination to
keep the war going” prevented his accepting Germany’s offer to end the
war in 1940: “There were several occasions when a rational leader could
have got, first reasonable, then excellent terms from Germany. Hitler
actually offered peace in July 1940 before the Battle of Britain
started. After the RAF victory, the German terms were still available,
now weighed more in Britain’s favor.”56
On
Aug. 14, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, Hitler called his field
marshals into the Reich Chancellery to impress upon them that victory
over Britain must not lead to the collapse of the British Empire:
Germany
is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be
Germany, but Japan in the east, Russia in India, Italy in the
Mediterranean, and America in world trade. This is why peace is possible
with Britain—but not so long as Churchill is prime minister. Thus we
must see what the Luftwaffe can do, and wait a possible general
election.57
Hitler
continued to search for a way to end the war he had never wanted. On
May 10, 1941, Deputy Fuehrer Rudolf Hess flew in a Messerschmitt 110 to
Scotland to attempt to negotiate a peace settlement with Great Britain.
On May 11, 1941, Rudolf Hess told the Duke of Hamilton why he had flown
to Scotland: “I am on a mission of humanity. The Fuehrer does not want
to defeat England and wants to stop fighting.”58
While
it is impossible to prove that Hess flew to Scotland with Hitler’s
knowledge and approval, the available evidence suggests that he did. The
relationship between Hess and Hitler was so close that one can
logically assume that Hess would not have undertaken such an important
step without first informing Hitler. Also, Hess was prohibited from
speaking openly about his mission during the entire 40-year period of
his imprisonment in Spandau prison. This “gag order” was obviously
imposed because Hess knew things that, if publicly known, would be
highly embarrassing to the Allied governments.59
A
peaceful settlement of the war was impossible after the announcement of
the Allied policy of unconditional surrender at a press conference in
Casablanca on Jan. 23, 1943. The Allied policy of unconditional
surrender ensured that the war would be fought to its bitter end.
Maurice Hankey, an experienced British statesman, summed up the effect
of the unconditional surrender policy as follows:
It
embittered the war, rendered inevitable a fight to the finish, banged
the door to the possibility of either side offering terms or opening up
negotiations, gave the Germans and the Japanese the courage of despair,
strengthened Hitler’s position as Germany’s “only hope,” aided
Goebbels’s propaganda, and made inevitable the Normandy landing and the
subsequent terribly exhausting and destructive advance through North
France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland and Germany. The lengthening of the
war enabled Stalin to occupy the whole of Eastern Europe, to ring down
the iron curtain and so to realize at one swoop a large installment of
his avowed aims against so-called capitalism, in which he includes
social democracy. . . . Not only the enemy countries, but nearly all
countries were bled white by this policy, which has left us all, except
the United States of America, impoverished and in dire straits.
Unfortunately also, these policies, so contrary to the spirit of the
Sermon on the Mount, did nothing to strengthen the moral position of the
Allies.60
Numerous
other historians and political leaders have stated that Great Britain
and the United States made it impossible for Germany to reach a peaceful
resolution to the war. It is widely acknowledged that Hitler did not
want a war with either Great Britain or the United States.61 Instead, Great Britain and the U.S. wanted war with Germany. In this regard, Rep. Hamilton Fish states:
If
Roosevelt and Churchill had really wished to deliver the world from the
menace of totalitarianism, they had their God-given opportunity on June
22, 1941. England could have withdrawn from the war and made peace with
Hitler on the most favorable terms. Hitler had no designs whatever on
the United States, so we would not have been endangered by this turn of
events. Then Hitler and Stalin would have fought each other into
exhaustion. This is exactly what the Baldwin-Chamberlain foreign policy
had originally envisaged. Mr. Truman, then a senator, strongly supported
this policy, as did Senator Vandenberg and many others. It would have
left the United States and England dominant powers in the world, and
they might have kept it a predominately free world.62
German
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had told Rep. Hamilton Fish
that cooperation between England and Germany was essential for the
maintenance of peace. Hitler had even “offered to place fifteen German
army divisions and the entire fleet at the disposal of the British
government to support her empire in case of war anywhere in the world.”
Fish did not believe this statement from von Ribbentrop at the time, but
it was substantiated years later.63
Hitler
voiced his puzzlement to the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin at Great
Britain’s refusal to accept his peace offers. Hitler felt he had
repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and
each time they had blacked his eye in reply. Hitler said, “The survival
of the British Empire is in Germany’s interest too because if Britain
loses India, we gain nothing thereby.”64
Even
a diplomat from Churchill’s own Conservative Party admitted: “To the
world at large, Churchill appeared to be the very embodiment of a policy
of war. To have brought him into Government when the balance between
peace and war was still quivering, might have definitely tilted the
scales on the side of war.”65
The
refusal of Winston Churchill to negotiate peace with Germany is
remarkable in that Churchill spoke of the evils of communism. Churchill
once said of communism:
It
is not only a creed; it is a plan of campaign. A Communist is not only
the holder of certain opinions, he is the pledge adept of a
well-thought-out means of enforcing them. The anatomy of discontent and
revolution has been studied in every phase and aspect, and a veritable
drill book prepared in a scientific spirit of sabotaging all existing
institutions. No faith need be kept with non-Communists. Every act of
goodwill, or tolerance or conciliation or mercy or magnanimity on the
part of governments or statesmen is to be utilized for their ruin. Then,
when the time is ripe and the moment opportune, every form of lethal
violence, from revolt to private assassination, must be used without
stint or compunction. The citadel will be stormed under the banners of
liberty and democracy, and once the apparatus of power is in the hands
of the Brotherhood, all opposition, all contrary opinions must be
extinguished by death. Democracy is but a tool to be used and afterwards
broken.66
Despite
his aversion to communism, Churchill ignored all German peace efforts
and joined the Soviet Union in the war against Germany.
On
Jan. 20, 1943, Joseph E. Davies disclosed that Hitler offered to retire
from office if by doing so Great Britain would make peace with Germany.
Churchill and other British leaders refused Hitler’s offer.67
Churchill
never once attempted to make peace with Germany. In a Jan. 1, 1944,
letter to Stalin, Churchill said: “We never thought of peace, not even
in that year when we were completely isolated and could have made peace
without serious detriment to the British Empire, and extensively at your
cost. Why should we think of it now, when victory approaches for the
three of us?”68
It
is well known that Churchill loved war. The English publicist, F. S.
Oliver, has written of Churchill: “From his youth up, Mr. Churchill has
loved with all his heart, all his mind, and with all his soul, and with
all his strength, three things: war, politics, and himself. He loved war
for its dangers, he loved politics for the same reason, and himself he
has always loved for the knowledge that his mind is dangerous. . . .”69 Churchill always wanted to continue the war against Germany rather than negotiate a peaceful settlement.
Even
leaders of the German resistance movement discovered that the Allied
policy of unconditional surrender would not change with Hitler dead. On
July 18, 1944, Otto John returned from fruitless negotiations with
Allied representatives in Madrid and informed his fellow plotters that
unconditional surrender would be in place even if they succeeded in
killing Hitler.
Dr.
Eugen Gerstenmaier, a former conspirator and president of the West
German Parliament after the war, stated in a 1975 interview: “What we in
the German resistance during the war did not want to see, we learned in
full measure afterward; that this war was ultimately not waged against
Hitler, but against Germany.”70
Great Britain Practices Uncivilized Warfare
In
addition to ignoring all German efforts to make peace, Churchill and
other leaders of Great Britain began to conduct a war of unprecedented
violence. On July 3, 1940, a British fleet attacked and destroyed much
of the French fleet at Oran in southwestern Algeria to prevent it from
falling into German hands. The French navy went to the bottom of the
sea, and with it 1,297 French sailors. Churchill and the British
government did not seem to mind that 1,297 of their French ally’s
sailors were killed in the attack. This attack of the French fleet
illustrates Churchill’s determination to continue fighting Hitler “no
matter what the cost.”71
A
surprising aspect of the British attack on the French fleet is that
low-flying British airplanes repeatedly machine-gunned masses of French
sailors as they struggled in the water. It is an event still remembered
with great bitterness in France. This deliberate British war crime was
soon followed by the assassination of French Adm. Darlan by British
agents in Algiers.72
Great
Britain also began to violate the essential rule of civilized warfare
that hostilities must be limited to the combatant forces. On May 11,
1940, British bombers began to attack the industrial areas of Germany.
The British government adopted a new definition of military objectives
so that this term included any building which in any way contributed,
directly or indirectly, to the war effort of the enemy.
On
Dec. 16, 1940, a moonlight raid by 134 British planes took place on
Mannheim designed “to concentrate the maximum amount of damage in the
center of the town.” Great Britain abandoned all pretense of attacking
military, industrial, or any other particular target with this raid.73
After
France surrendered on June 22, 1940, for about a month Hitler clung to
the hope that the war could be brought to an end by a negotiated peace.
Once Hitler realized that a negotiated peace was impossible, Hitler
launched a massive air attack on Britain in order to win command of the
air. The German air attacks were purely a military operation, carried
out mainly in daylight, against airfields, docks and shipping. It was
not until Sept. 6, 1940, that the German Luftwaffe was ordered to launch
a reprisal air offensive against Great Britain. These German reprisal
attacks were exactly similar to the British air attacks against Germany
which had been going on ever since May 11, 1940.
The
two air offensives continued concurrently until the spring of 1941,
when the Luftwaffe was withdrawn to take part in the invasion of the
Soviet Union. The German air offensive was a complete failure in that it
did not achieve its sole purpose of inducing the British government to
discontinue the air offensive against Germany. The British air offensive
was a failure to the extent that it did nothing towards crippling
Germany’s war production. However, it was a huge success to the extent
that it generated a frenzied war psychosis in Great Britain and
prevented the war from stagnating. The British public incorrectly
believed that the British air offensive against Germany was merely a
justified reprisal for the attacks of the Luftwaffe on Great Britain.
The British public did not realize that it was Great Britain that had
initiated the air attacks.74
On
March 28, 1942, the British air offensive against Germany initiated
Frederick Lindemann’s bombing plan. The Lindemann Plan, which continued
with undiminished ferocity until the end of the war, concentrated on
bombing German working-class houses. The British bombing during this
period was simple terror bombing designed to shatter the morale of the
German civilian population and thereby generate an inclination to
surrender. The bombing focused on working-class houses built close
together because a higher percentage of bloodshed per ton of explosives
dropped could be expected as opposed to bombing higher class houses
surrounded by large yards and gardens.75
The
climax of the British bombing offensive under the Lindemann Plan was
reached on the night of Feb. 13, 1945, when a massive bombing raid was
directed against Dresden. The population of Dresden was swollen by a
horde of terrified German women and children running from the advancing
Soviet army. No one will ever know exactly how many people died in the
bombing of Dresden, but estimates of 250,000 or more civilian deaths
appear to be reasonable. The bombing of Dresden served no military
purpose; it was designed solely to terrify the German civilian
population and break their will to continue the war.76
A
horrifying aspect of the Dresden terror bombings occurred during the
daylight hours of Feb. 14, 1945. On this day low-flying British fighters
machine-gunned thousands of helpless Germans as they rushed toward the
Elbe River in a desperate attempt to escape the inferno. Since Dresden
had no air defense, the German civilians were easy targets.77
As
word of the savage bombings of innocent German civilians began to
filter to the outside world, the British government initially denied the
slaughter. British leaders declared that the targets of the British air
offensive were always military in nature. Despite the persistent
government denials, the truth of the British mass bombings of civilian
targets could not be suppressed forever. Critics of the civilian
bombings became concerned about the moral demise of Great Britain. For
example, British historian Basil Liddell Hart stated: “It will be
ironical if the defenders of civilization depend for victory upon the
most barbaric, and unskilled, way of winning a war that the modern world
has seen. . . . We are now counting for victory on success in the way
of degrading it to a new level—as represented by indiscriminate (night)
bombing.”78
Evidence
of the ruthless mass bombings of congested German cities was provided
by many of the British bomber crews themselves. The almost total lack of
German opposition to the British bombings toward the end of the war
made the bombing of cities less like war and more like murder. While
open criticism of government policy was not allowed, the guilt of young
British flyers occasionally surfaced. One British crewman confessed:
“There were people down there being fried to death in melted asphalt in
the roads, they were being burnt up and we were shuffling incendiary
bombs into this holocaust. I felt terribly sorry for the people in the
fire I was helping to stoke up.”79
After
the destruction of Dresden, outrage was directed at Arthur Harris, the
British Chief of Bomber Command. Once known affectionately by his men as
“Bomber” Harris, after Dresden many of his men nicknamed him “Butcher”
Harris. One angry British crewman later explained: “We were told at the
briefing that there were many thousands of Panzer troops in the streets
[of Dresden], either going to or coming back from the Russian Front. My
personal feeling is that if we’d been told the truth at the briefing,
some of us wouldn’t have gone.”80
Winston
Churchill, the man directly responsible for the Dresden holocaust,
began to publicly distance himself from the terror bombings. Churchill
stated to Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the British Air Staff, on
March 28, 1945:
It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts
should be reviewed. The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query
against the conduct of Allied bombing. . . . I feel the need for more
precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and
communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere
acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.81
In
spite of Churchill’s protests, the British terror bombing continued
unabated until the end of the war. On May 3, 1945, the British Royal Air
Force attacked the German Cap Arcona and Thielbek
passenger ships. Both of these ships were flying many large white flags
with huge Red Cross emblems painted on the sides of the ships. The
British attacks, which were a violation of international law, resulted
in the deaths of approximately 7,000 prisoners being shipped from the
Neuengamme concentration camp to Stockholm. When large numbers of
corpses dressed in concentration camp garb washed ashore the German
coastline a few days later, the British claimed the Germans had
intentionally drowned the prisoners in the Baltic Sea. It took years for
the truth of the illegal British attacks to be made public.82
After
Dresden, Joseph Goebbels angrily urged Hitler to retaliate by
abrogating the Geneva Convention. However, Hitler and his military staff
continued to abide by the Geneva Convention throughout the war. As a
result, almost 99% of Allied prisoners of war survived the war to return
home.83
Like
Winston Churchill, other British leaders responsible for the terror
bombings began distancing themselves from the deeds when the details of
atrocities at Dresden and other places became publicly known. British
commander Sir Arthur Harris insisted he was only following orders from
“higher up.” Harris and other Allied leaders actually had very little to
fear. The Allies had, after all, won the war. With an army of
journalists, film makers, and historians to cover their tracks, none of
the Allied war criminals risked being held accountable for their crimes.84
Allies Conspire to Allow STALIN to Control Eastern Europe
In
addition to not negotiating peace with Germany and practicing
uncivilized warfare, the Allied leaders intentionally allowed the Soviet
Union to take over Berlin and Eastern Europe. The Supreme Allied
Commander in the West, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, had no intention of
occupying Berlin. According to Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, “Stalin said
that if it hadn’t been for Eisenhower, we wouldn’t have succeeded in
capturing Berlin.”85
Stalin
wanted his troops to reach as far into Europe as possible to enable the
Soviet Union to control more of Europe after the war was over. Stalin
knew that once the Soviet troops had a stronghold in Eastern Europe, it
would be almost impossible to dislodge them. Soviet hegemony could not
be dislodged unless Roosevelt wanted to take on the Soviet Union after
fighting Germany. Stalin said in private: “Whoever occupies a territory
imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as
far as his army can reach.”86
The
United States could have easily prevented the Soviet Union from
marching so far west into Europe. After defeating Germany in North
Africa, the Americans and British went into Sicily and then Italy.
Churchill favored an advance up the Italian or Balkan peninsulas into
central Europe. Such a march would be quicker in reaching Berlin, but
Roosevelt and Stalin opposed this strategy at the Tehran Conference in
November 1943. In general sessions at Tehran with Churchill present,
Roosevelt opposed strengthening the Italian campaign. Instead, Roosevelt
wanted troops in Italy to go to France for the larger cross-Channel
attack planned for 1944.87
Gen.
Mark Clark, the American commander in Italy, later commented on
Roosevelt’s decision: “The weakening of the campaign in Italy in order
to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was
one of the outstanding mistakes of the war. . . . Stalin knew exactly
what he wanted . . . and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of
the Balkans.”88
The
Allied military leaders also intentionally prevented Gen. George Patton
from quickly defeating Germany in Western Europe. In August 1944,
Patton’s Third Army was presented with an opportunity to encircle the
Germans at Falaise, France. However, Gens. Omar Bradley and Dwight
Eisenhower ordered Patton to stop at Argentan and not complete the
encirclement of the Germans, which most historians agree Patton could
have done. As a result, probably 100,000 or more German soldiers escaped
to later fight U.S. troops in December 1944 in the last-ditch
counterattack known as the Battle of the Bulge.89
Patton
wrote in his diary concerning the halt that prevented the encirclement
of Germans at Falaise: “This halt [was] a great mistake. [Bradley’s]
motto seems to be, ‘In case of doubt, halt.’ I wish I were supreme
commander.”90
Maj.
Gen. Richard Rohmer, who was a Canadian fighter pilot at the time,
wrote that if the gap had closed it “could have brought the surrender of
the Third Reich, whose senior generals were now desperately concerned
about the ominous shadow of the great Russian Bear rising on the eastern
horizon of the Fatherland.” Even Col. Ralph Ingersoll, Gen. Bradley’s
own historian, wrote, “The failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap was
the loss of the greatest single opportunity of the war.”91
By
Aug. 31, 1944, Patton had put Falaise behind and quickly advanced his
tanks to the Meuse River, only 63 miles from the German border and 140
miles from the Rhine River. The German army Patton was chasing was
disorganized and in disarray; nothing could stop Patton from roaring
into Germany. However, on August 31, the Third Army’s gasoline allotment
was suddenly cut by 140,000 gallons per day. This was a huge chunk of
the 350,000 to 400,000 gallons per day the Third Army had been
consuming. Patton’s advance was halted even though the way ahead was
open and largely undefended by the German army in retreat.
Siegfried
Westphal, Gen. von Rundstedt’s chief of staff, later described the
condition of the German army on the day Patton was stopped: “The overall
situation in the West [for the Germans] was serious in the extreme. The
Allies could have punched through at any point with ease.” The halt of
the Third Army blitzkrieg allowed the Germans to reposition and
revitalize. With the knowledge that they were defending their home soil,
the Germans found a new purpose for fighting. They were not just waging
a war, but were defending their families from what they regarded as
revenge seeking hordes.92
Germany
took advantage of the overall Allied slowdown and reorganized her
troops into a major fighting force. Germany’s counterattack in the
Battle of the Bulge took Allied forces completely by surprise. The
Germans created a “bulge” in the lax American line, and the Allies ran
the risk of being cut off and possibly annihilated or thrown back into
the sea. Patton had to pull back his Third Army in the east and begin
another full scale attack on the southern flank of the German forces.
Patton’s troops arrived in a matter of days and were the crucial factor
in pushing the German bulge back into Germany.93
Patton
was enthused after the Battle of the Bulge and wanted to quickly take
his Third Army into the heart of Germany. The German army had no more
reserves and was definitely on its last legs. However, once again Patton
was held back by Gen Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff led by
Gen. Marshall. Patton was dumbfounded. Patton wrote: “I’ll be damned if
I see why we have divisions if not to use them. One would think people
would like to win a war . . . we will be criticized by history, and
rightly so, for having sat still so long.”94
The
Western Allies were still in a position to easily capture Berlin.
However, Eisenhower ordered a halt of American troops on the Elbe River,
thereby in effect presenting a gift to the Soviet Union of central
Germany and much of Europe. One American Staff officer bitterly
commented: “No German force could have stopped us. The only thing that
stood between [the] Ninth Army and Berlin was Eisenhower.”95
On
May 8, 1945, the day the war in Europe officially ended, Patton spoke
his mind in an “off the record” press briefing. With tears in his eyes,
Patton recalled those “who gave their lives in what they believed was
the final fight in the cause of freedom.” Patton continued:
I
wonder how [they] will speak today when they know that for the first
time in centuries we have opened Central and Western Europe to the
forces of Genghis Khan. I wonder how they feel now that they know there
will be no peace in our times and that Americans, some not yet born,
will have to fight the Russians tomorrow, or 10, 15 or 20 years from
tomorrow. We have spent the last months since the Battle of the Bulge
and the crossing of the Rhine stalling; waiting for Montgomery to get
ready to attack in the North; occupying useless real estate and killing a
few lousy Huns when we should have been in Berlin and Prague. And this
Third Army could have been. Today we should be telling the Russians to
go to hell instead of hearing them tell us to pull back. We should be
telling them if they didn’t like it to go to hell and invite them to
fight. We’ve defeated one aggressor against mankind and established a
second far worse, more evil and more dedicated than the first.96
A
few days later Patton shocked everyone at a Paris hotel gathering by
saying basically the same things. At a later gathering in Berlin, when
asked to drink a toast with a Soviet general, Patton told his
translator, “tell that Russian sonovabitch that from the way they are
acting here, I regard them as enemies and I’d rather cut my throat than
have a drink with one of my enemies!”97
Patton
became known among U.S. and Soviet leaders as a bona fide menace and a
threat to world peace. In addition, Patton was viewed as insubordinate,
uncontrollable, and, in the eyes of some, treasonous. Douglas Bazata
claims to have been given the order to assassinate Patton by the Office
of Strategic Services, an American military espionage ring. Bazata says
he shot Patton during a planned auto wreck of Patton’s vehicle on Dec.
9, 1945. Patton later died in a hospital on Dec. 21, 1945, under very
suspicious circumstances.98
Did Germany Conspire to Start World War II?
No
confirmation has ever been found in German archives that Germany
conspired to instigate World War II. The Axis powers also never had a
clear-cut plan for achieving world domination. Gen. George Marshall
points out in a report titled The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific that
there was never close cooperation among the Axis powers. Marshall’s
report, which was published after the war, was based on American
intelligence reports and interviews with captured German commanders.
Marshall’s report contains the following statements:
No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan. . . .
When
Italy entered the war Mussolini’s strategic aims contemplated the
expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success.
Field Marshal Keitel reveals that Italy’s declaration of war was
contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that
it was undesired. . . .
Nor
is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and
Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the
neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down
strong British and American land, sea and air forces in the Far East.
In
the absence of anything so far to the contrary, it is believed that
Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified
strategic plan. . . .
Not
only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their
plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to
proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater
discord. The Axis as a matter of fact existed on paper only.99
Hitler confirms the lack of military coordination between Germany and Italy in his Testament. Hitler states:
Even
while they proved themselves incapable of maintaining their positions
in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw
themselves, without seeking our advice and without even giving us
previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless campaign in
Greece. The shameful defeats which they suffered caused certain of the
Balkan States to regard us with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere
else, are to be found the causes of Yugoslavia’s stiffening and her volte-face
in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to
intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic
delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to
expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were
then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid
show, the presence of any of our troops would have been quite
unnecessary.100
British
historian A.J.P. Taylor agrees that Hitler did not conspire to
instigate war or conquer the world. Taylor states: “Hitler did not make
plans—for world conquest or anything else. He assumed that others would
provide opportunities, and that he would seize them.”101
Could Germany Have Averted World War II?
A
review of the historical record indicates that it would have been
extremely difficult for Germany to have averted World War II.
Adolf
Hitler came to power in 1933 determined to free Germany from the
Versailles Treaty’s onerous provisions. The Treaty of Versailles was a
deliberate violation of the pre-Armistice contract that was to be based
on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Germany was forced to sign the
Versailles Treaty against her will and to admit sole responsibility for
the origin of World War I. Consequently, Germany had to pay burdensome
reparations to the Allies, lost large amounts of her territory including
all of her colonies, and was left defenseless against potential
enemies. By 1928, historians had documented that Germany was not
primarily responsible for originating World War I.102 The Allies, however, refused to renounce or modify the Versailles Treaty.
Hitler’s
determination to free Germany from the Versailles Treaty was entirely
justified. No responsible leader would have allowed his nation to be
subject to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty forever. Hitler began
to rearm Germany beginning in March 1935. On March 7, 1936, Hitler sent
troops into the Rhineland to protect Germany’s western borders from
invasion by constructing the Siegfried Line. Great Britain and France
did not challenge Hitler’s move because there was a general feeling that
Germany was only asserting a right of sovereignty within her own
borders.
The impetus toward World War II began with the Anschluss
in March 1938. Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg of Austria announced on March
9, 1938, that Austria would hold a plebiscite four days later to decide
if Austria would remain forever independent of Germany. The proposed
plebiscite was a total farce in that, among other reasons, only a yes ballot for independence was issued from the government. Anyone wishing to vote no had to provide their own ballot, the same size as the yes ballots, with nothing on it but the word no. Hitler marched into Austria with his army to stop the phony plebiscite.
The Anschluss
with Germany was hugely popular among the Austrian people. Austria had
been part of Germany for more than 1,000 years prior to World War I. The
legislators of Austria had voted to join Germany after World War I, but
the architects of the Versailles Treaty refused to abide by the desire
of the Austrian legislators. The Anschluss was regarded by most Austrians as an act of liberation from a hated puppet regime.103
However, even though not a shot was fired, by using his army Hitler
lost the asset of aggrieved morality. Hitler appeared to the world for
the first time as a conqueror relying on force.
A
crisis later developed when the Czech government and military leaders
decided on May 20, 1938, to order a partial mobilization of the Czech
armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the lie that German
troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. President Benes and
other Czech leaders then lied to the world press that Czechoslovakia had
forced Germany to back down. Hitler was furious and decided that the
desire of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia to return to Germany
should now be fulfilled.
The
threat of war ended when the Munich Agreement was signed on Sept. 30,
1938, by Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy. Hitler got
substantially everything he wanted, and the Sudeten Germans returned to
the Reich. Similar to the Anschluss
with Austria, the Sudeten Germans regarded the Munich Agreement as an
act of liberation from a hated regime. The British war enthusiasts,
however, denounced the Munich Agreement as an inappropriate appeasement
of Germany. The warmongering that led to World War II began to increase
in Great Britain.
After
the Munich Agreement, a crisis developed in Czechoslovakia when
Slovakia declared her independence from Czech rule on March 14, 1939.
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia that followed occurred without the
design or encouragement from Germany. The Protectorate of
Bohemia-Moravia established on March 16, 1939, was legalized by
agreements signed with the Czech and Slovak leaders. German troops
occupied Prague for over a month to provide stability pursuant to these
agreements. Hitler acted only when events had already destroyed the
settlement of Munich. Most people outside Germany, however, thought
Hitler had intentionally planned the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.
Halifax
hypocritically expressed his hostile views concerning Germany’s
occupation of Prague, and promised that Hitler would be forced to shed
blood the next time. British officials said that Hitler had overstepped
his bounds, and that his word could never be trusted again. The truth is
that Halifax and other British officials did not care about
Czechoslovakia. They were merely using the Czech crisis as a means to
stir up hostility toward Germany among the British public.104
In
hindsight, Hitler’s establishment of the Protectorate of
Bohemia-Moravia proved to be a tactical mistake. It probably would have
been better for Hitler not to have involved Germany in the resolution of
the Czech crisis. This would have prevented the British warmongers from
claiming that Hitler had violated the Munich Agreement.
Halifax
also supported the hoax that Germany was seeking to obtain control of
the entire Romanian economy, and that Germany had terrified Romanian
leaders with an ultimatum. Halifax continued to support these claims
even after their falsehood had been exposed. Halifax made these and
other false claims in order to further turn the British public’s opinion
against Germany. Obviously, Hitler could not have prevented Halifax
from making these lies against him.
The
impetus for war continued when Great Britain announced an unconditional
unilateral guarantee of Poland’s independence on March 31, 1939. This
unprecedented blank check to Poland obligated Great Britain to go to war
if the Poles decided war was necessary. Polish authorities proceeded to
instigate numerous acts of murder, beatings, deportation and
discrimination against the Germans of Poland and Danzig. It was “open
season” on the Germans in Poland. Hitler soon had more than sufficient
justification to go to war with Poland based on traditional practices
among nations.
British
Ambassador Nevile Henderson tried to inform Halifax of these Polish
atrocities, but Halifax refused to listen. Halifax was interested in
Poland only as a means of fomenting war against Germany. Polish
newspapers recklessly admitted that Polish units were constantly
crossing the German frontier to destroy German military installations
and to carry confiscated German military equipment into Poland. Józef
Beck also refused any peace negotiations with Germany.
The
leaders of the German minority in Poland repeatedly appealed to the
Polish government for mercy during this period, but to no avail. More
than 80,000 German refugees had been forced to leave Poland by Aug. 20,
1939, and virtually all other ethnic Germans in Poland were clamoring to
leave to escape Polish atrocities.105
Hitler
was forced to invade Poland to end these atrocities against Poland’s
ethnic German minority. Hitler had hoped the Molotov-Ribbentrop
agreement would persuade Great Britain not to declare war on Germany.
However, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany two days after
Germany’s invasion of Poland.
Hitler
planned to offer to restore sovereignty to the Czech state and to
Western Poland as part of a peace proposal with Great Britain and
France. Joachim von Ribbentrop informed Soviet leaders of Hitler’s
intention in a note on Sept. 15, 1939. Stalin and Molotov sought to
stifle any action that might bring Germany and the Allies to the
conference table. They told Ribbentrop that they did not approve of the
resurrection of the Polish state. Aware of Germany’s dependency on
Soviet trade, Hitler abandoned his plan to reestablish Polish statehood.106
Numerous
historians who blame Hitler for starting World War II claim that if
Hitler had wanted peace he would not have been so impatient to undo the
Versailles Treaty. In reality Hitler was responding to the actions of
the Austrian, Czech, and Polish leaders. American historian David Hoggan
writes:
Schuschnigg
had challenged Germany with a fraudulent anti-German plebiscite scheme,
and Hitler responded by intervening in Austria. Benes challenged
Germany with a Czech mobilization based on the false claim of German
troop concentrations on the Czech frontier. Hitler responded with his
decision to liberate the Sudetenland from Czech rule in 1938. Beck
challenged Germany with a partial mobilization and a threat of war, and
Hitler, who deeply desired friendship with Poland, refrained from
responding at all. It was not until Beck joined the British encirclement
front that Hitler took precautionary military measures against the
Polish threat. It would have been incompatible with the security of
Germany to refrain from doing so, after the formation of a hostile
Anglo-Polish combination. The charge that Hitler did not know how to
wait can be applied more appropriately to the Austrian, Czech, and
Polish leaders.107
Harry
Elmer Barnes agreed with Hoggan’s analysis. Barnes stated: “The primary
responsibility for the outbreak of the German-Polish War was that of
Poland and Britain, while for the transformation of the German-Polish
conflict into a European War, Britain, guided by Halifax, was almost
exclusively responsible.”108
Barnes
further stated: “It has now been irrefutably established on a
documentary basis that Hitler was no more responsible for war in 1939
than the Kaiser was in 1914, if indeed as responsible. . . . Hitler’s
responsibility in 1939 was far less than that of Beck in Poland, Halifax
in England or even Daladier in France.”109
Dr.
Barnes also disputed the generally accepted theory of Hitler’s
diabolism. Barnes stated that some very well informed people contended
that Hitler was too soft, generous and honorable rather than too tough
and ruthless. They point to the following considerations:
[Hitler]
made a genuine and liberal peace offer to Britain on August 25, 1939;
he permitted the British to escape at Dunkirk to encourage Britain to
make peace, which later on cost him the war in North Africa; he failed
to occupy all of France, take North Africa at once, and split the
British Empire; he lost the Battle of Britain by failing to approve the
savagery of saturation bombing of civilians and to build armed bombers
to carry on this type of military barbarism which played so large a role
in the Allied victory; he delayed his attack on Russia and offered
Molotov lavish concessions in November, 1940, to keep peace between
Germany and Russia; he lost the war with Russia by delaying the invasion
in order to bail Mussolini out of his idiotic attack on Greece; and he
declared war on the United States to keep his pledged word with Japan
which had long before made it clear that it deserved no such
consideration and loyalty from Hitler.110
The
Allies had planned a long and devastating war resulting in the complete
destruction of Germany. This is indicated by a conversation on Nov. 21,
1938, between William Bullitt and Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki.
According to what military experts told Bullitt during the fall-crisis
of 1938, a war lasting at least six years would break out in Europe. In
the military experts’ opinion the war would result in the complete
destruction of Europe, with communism reigning in all European states.
The benefits would accrue to the Soviet Union at the conclusion of the
war. Bullitt, who enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt,
also told Potocki that the United States would take part in the war
after Great Britain and France had made the first move. The complete
destruction of Germany and the communist takeover of Eastern Europe
occurred exactly as Bullitt had predicted.111
It
is difficult to see how Hitler could have avoided war in Europe no
matter what policies he adopted. Even if Hitler had passively accepted
the chains of the Versailles Treaty and did nothing to rearm, the Soviet
Union would have eventually attacked Germany and taken over all of
Europe.
The Lawless Allied Conspiracy Against Modern Civilization
In
his final statement at the Nuremberg trial, Hermann Goering said he
“did not want a war” and “did not bring it about.” Franz von Papen was
beside himself. At the lunch break he furiously attacked Goering: “Who
in the world is responsible for all this destruction if not you? You
haven’t taken the responsibility for anything! All you do is make
bombastic speeches. It is disgraceful!” Goering laughed at Papen in
response.112
Goering
was correct that Germany was not primarily responsible for starting
World War II. Adolf Hitler and National Socialist Germany had not wanted
a war. Instead, the historical record clearly indicates that the Allied
leaders had conspired to both instigate and prolong World War II. It
was the Allied leaders who had engaged in a lawless conspiracy against
the decencies of modern civilization.
In
addition to the Allied leaders, the Western press showed no constraint
when it came to stirring up hatred against Germany. Germany was
constantly portrayed as a threat to other nations. In this regard,
Hitler remarked in his Reichstag speech on April 28, 1939:
As
far as Germany is concerned, I am not aware that threats of that kind
are being made against other nations; but I do read every day in the
democratic newspapers lies about these threats. I read every day of
German mobilization, of landings, of extortions and that against
countries with whom we are living not only in perfect tranquility, but
with whom we have, in many cases, a deep friendship.
[T]hen
it is criminal negligence, not to use a stronger expression, when heads
of nations, who have at their disposal the power, are incapable of
tightening the reins of the war-mongering press and so keep the world
safe from the threatening disaster of a military conflict.113
The
Allied nations and the Western press did more than conspire to start a
world war leading to the complete destruction of Germany. The historical
record shows that the Allies were planning a devastating treatment of
Germany after the end of the war. In the next three chapters we will
examine the horrific Allied crimes committed against the German people
after the end of World War II.
CHAPTER NOTES:
1 Aug. 26, 1944, memorandum from Roosevelt to Stimson, in Morgenthau Diary (Germany), Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: Senate Judiciary Committee, 1967, p. 445. Quoted in Hitchcock, William I., The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe, New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 171.
2 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, p. 83.
3 Greaves, Percy L. Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 410.
4
Feb. 12, 1946, conversation between William Bullitt and Henry Wallace,
from Henry Wallace Diary, Henry Wallace Papers, Library of Congress
Manuscripts, Washington, D.C. Quoted in Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 240.
5 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, pp. 254-255.
6 Greaves, Percy L. Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 409.
7 Beard, Charles A., President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, pp. 306-307.
8 Greaves, Percy L. Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 409, 466.
9 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, pp. 255-257.
10 Ibid., Preface, pp. XIII-XIV.
11 Ibid., pp. 203-204.
12 Theobald, Robert A., The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, Old Greenwich, CT: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954, pp. 192, 198, 201.
13 Ibid., pp. 193-195.
14 Ibid., Foreword, pp. vii-viii.
15 Kimmel, Husband E., Admiral Kimmel’s Story, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955, p. 110.
16 Ibid., p. 186.
17 Richardson, James O., On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, p. 450.
18 Kimmel, Thomas K. Jr., “Kimmel and Short: Vindicated,” The Barnes Review, Vol. IX, No. 2, March/April 2003, p. 42.
19 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War Within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 26.
20 Barnes, Harry Elmer, Barnes Against the Blackout, Costa Mesa, CA: The Institute for Historical Review, 1991, pp. 285-286.
21 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 352.
22 Ibid., p. 364.
23 Fischer, Klaus P., Hitler and America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, p. 140.
24 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, pp. xi-xii.
25 Ibid., pp. 139, 149-150.
26 Ibid., p. 150.
27 Ibid., p. 76.
28 Ibid., p. 116.
29 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, pp. 106-108.
30 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, translated by James Murphy, London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 1939, p. 364.
31 Ibid.
32 Henderson, Sir Nevile, Failure of a Mission, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, p. 115.
33 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 472.
34 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, pp. 385-386.
35 Davies, Norman, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, New York: Viking Penguin, 2007, p. 483.
36 Degrelle, Leon Gen., Hitler Democrat, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2012, p. 11.
37 Koster, John, Operation Snow, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012, pp. 135-137, 169.
38 Ibid., p. 215.
39 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 250-251.
40 Folsom, Burton W. Jr. and Anita, FDR Goes to War, New York: Threshold Editions, 2011, pp. 242, 245.
41 Irving, David, Hitler’s War, New York: Avon Books, 1990, p. 3.
42 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. xxi.
43 Ibid., pp. 217-218.
44 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, p. 331.
45 Bullock, Alan, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 337.
46 Hart, B. H. Liddell, The Other Side of the Hill, London: Papermac, 1970, pp. 200-201; see also Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 76.
47 Ibid.
48 Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 72-73.
49 Bradberry, Benton L., The Myth of German Villainy, Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2012, p. 369.
50 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, London: Odhams Press, 1948, p. 373.
51 Hinsley, F.H., Hitler’s Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 81.
52 Ferguson, Niall, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Power Order and the Lessons of Global Power, New York: Basic, 2003, pp. 330-331.
53 Hitler, Adolf, My New Order, Edited with commentary by Raoul de Roussy de Sales, New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941, p. 837.
54 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 84.
55 Hinsley, F.H., Hitler’s Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 82.
56 Clark, Alan, “A Reputation Ripe for Revision,” London Times, Jan. 2, 1993.
57 Denman, Roy, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Indigo, 1997, p. 130.
58 Langer, Howard J., World War II: An Encyclopedia of Quotations, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999, p. 142.
59 Hess, Wolf Ruediger, “The Life and Death of My Father, Rudolf Hess,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 1993, pp. 29, 31.
60 Hankey, Maurice Pascal Alers, Politics, Trials and Errors, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 125-126.
61 Fischer, Klaus P., Hitler and America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, p. 2.
62 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, p. 115.
63 Ibid., p. 87.
64 Irving, David, Hitler’s War, New York: Avon Books, 1990, p. 236.
65 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, p. 272.
66 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, p. 51.
67 Walsh, Michael, Hidden Truths About the Second World War, United Kingdom: The Historical Review Press, 2012, p. 15.
68 Walendy, Udo, The Methods of Reeducation, Vlotho/Weser, Germany: Verlag für Volkstum und Zeitgeschichtsforschung, 1979, p. 3.
69 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, pp. 115-116.
70 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, p. 257.
71 Fischer, Klaus P., Hitler and America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, pp. 122-123.
72 Bird, Vivian, “An Examination of British War Crimes During World War II,” The Barnes Review, Vol. VI, No. 6, Nov. /Dec. 2000, p. 56.
73 Veale, Frederick J. P., Advance to Barbarism, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 182-183.
74 Ibid., p. 183.
75 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
76 Ibid., pp. 185-186, 192-193.
77 Bird, Vivian, “An Examination of British War Crimes During World War II,” The Barnes Review, Vol. VI, No. 6, Nov. /Dec. 2000, p. 59.
78 Goodrich, Thomas, Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany 1944-1947, Sheridan, CO: Aberdeen Books, 2010, pp. 36-37.
79 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
80 Ibid., p. 124.
81 Veale, Frederick J. P., Advance to Barbarism, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 194.
82 “The 1945 Sinking of the Cap Arcona and the Thielbek,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, July/Aug. 2000, pp. 2-3; see also Schmidt, Hans, Hitler Boys in America: Re-Education Exposed, Pensacola, FL: Hans Schmidt Publications, 2003, pp. 231-232.
83 Goodrich, Thomas, Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany 1944-1947, Sheridan, CO: Aberdeen Books, 2010, pp. 126-127.
84 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
85 Nadaeu, Remi, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe, New York: Praeger, 1990, p. 163.
86 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 318.
87 Folsom, Burton W. Jr. and Anita, FDR Goes to War, New York: Threshold Editions, 2011, pp. 237-238.
88 Ibid., pp. 238-239.
89 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 284-288.
90 Blumenson, Martin, ed., The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974, pp. 508, 511.
91 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, p. 288.
92 Ibid., pp. 290-298.
93 Ibid., pp. 300-301.
94 Ibid., p. 313.
95 Lucas, James, Last Days of the Reich—The Collapse of Nazi Germany, May 1945, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986, p. 196.
96 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 331-332.
97 Ibid., p. 333.
98 Ibid., pp. 342, 391.
99 Marshall, George C., General Marshall’s Report—The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific. Published
for the War Department in cooperation with the Council on Books in
Wartime, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 1-3. Quoted in
Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 351.
100 Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 46-47.
101 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. 134.
102 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 6.
103 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 98.
104 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 204-205.
105 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 358, 382, 388, 391-92, 479.
106 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, pp. 160-161.
107 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 312.
108 Barnes, Harry Elmer, Barnes Against the Blackout, Costa Mesa, CA: The Institute for Historical Review, 1991, p. 222.
109 Ibid., pp. 227, 249.
110 Ibid., pp. 251-252.
111 Count Jerzy Potocki to Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, The German White Paper: Full Text of the Polish Documents Issued by the Berlin Foreign Office; with a forward by C. Hartley Grattan, New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, 1940, pp. 19-21.
112 Taylor, Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992, pp. 535-536.
113 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, pp. 34-35.
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