WHO is a bought -and -paid -for organization that serves Gates’ vaccine agenda and Big Pharma’s profits
Image: Bill Gates paid millions in an attempt to normalise Jewish male infant ritual genital mutilation MGM by conning over 600,000 African men and boys into being genitally mutilated by promising that they would be protected from AIDSBy Dr. Paul Craig Roberts: Are NIH and CDC also under the giant thumb of Bill Gates & Big Pharma?
WHO representative Catherine Smallwood just repeated on TV in Belgium a massive lie contrary to all scientific knowledge about Covid-19. The mouthpiece for Gates & Big Pharma said that there is no aerosol transmission of the virus.
For Bill Gates and Big Pharma, science is in their way and has to be denied, discredited, and truth-telling scientists cut off from research money.
Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: The world should face the reality
Abstract
Hand
washing and maintaining social distance are the main measures
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) to avoid contracting
COVID-19. Unfortunately, these measured do not prevent infection by
inhalation of small droplets exhaled by an infected person that can
travel distance of meters or tens of meters in the air and carry their
viral content. Science explains the mechanisms of such transport and
there is evidence that this is a significant route of infection in
indoor environments. Despite this, no countries or authorities consider
airborne spread of COVID-19 in their regulations to prevent infections
transmission indoors. It is therefore extremely important, that the
national authorities acknowledge the reality that the virus spreads
through air, and recommend that adequate control measures be implemented
to prevent further spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, in particularly
removal of the virus-laden droplets from indoor air by ventilation.
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It
could be said that compared with previous global epidemics or
pandemics, humanity is much better equipped to control the new epidemic.
The virus’s gene sequence was identified and made public and a testing
method was developed within two weeks after its existence was announced (Zhu et al. 2020), launching the race to develop a protective vaccine (Yan et al. 2020).
In addition, testing methods measuring the infection (using RT-PCR) and
measuring the antibodies formed after being infected (using
immunoassays) (Elfaitouri et al., 2005, Souf, 2016;9.). Real-time statistics on all aspects of the virus’s transmission are available online (Worldometers 2020). Countries have enacted emergency response procedures, and travel bans have been put in place (Tian et al. 2020), and lockdown procedures which limit the movement of people inside the administrative zones.
Unfortunately,
the truth is that we have only a rudimentary knowledge of several
aspects of infection spread, including on one critical aspect of the
SARS-CoV-2 virus: how THIS virus transmits (Bourouiba, 2020, Brosseau, 2020).
In general it is considered that viral respiratory infections spread by
direct contact, such as touching an infected person or the surfaces and
fomites that the person has either touched, or on which large
virus-containing droplets expired by the person have landed (Morawska 2006), and there the virus can remain stable for days (van Doremalen et al. 2020).
The droplets can also be deposited directly on a person in close
proximity to the infected person. Therefore, frequent hand-washing and
maintaining a distance of at least one meter (arm’s length) are
considered the main precautions against contracting the infection (WHO 2020a).
One transmission route that is mentioned only in passing, or not at
all, is the transport of virus-laden particles in the air. Immediately
after droplets are expired, the liquid content starts to evaporate, and
some droplets become so small that transport by air current affects them
more than gravitation. Such small droplets are free to travel in the
air and carry their viral content meters and tens of meters from where
they originated (e.g. Morawska et al. 2009), as graphically presented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
Larger droplets with viral content deposit close to the emission point
(droplet transmission), while smaller can travel meters or tens of
meters long distances in the air indoors (aerosol transmission).
Is
it likely that the SARS-CoV-2 virus spreads by air? Its predecessor,
SARS-CoV-1, did spread in the air. This was reported in several studies
and retrospectively explained the pathway of transmission in Hong Kong’s
Prince of Wales Hospital (Li et al., 2005, Xiao et al., 2017;12., Yu et al., 2005), as well as in health care facilities in Toronto, Canada (Booth et al. 2005), and in aircraft (Olsen et al. 2003).
These studies concluded that airborne transmission was the main
transmission route in the indoor cases studied. Other examples of
airborne transmission of viral infections include the spread of
Norwalk-like virus between school children (Marks et al. 2003), and the transmission of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets (Herfst et al. 2012). A World Health Organization (WHO 2009)
review of the evidence stated that viral infectious diseases can be
transmitted across distances relevant to indoor environments by aerosols
(e.g. airborne infections), and can result in large clusters of
infection in a short period. Considering the many similarities between
the two SARS viruses and the evidence on virus transport in general, it
is highly likely that the SARS-CoV-2 virus also spreads by air (Fineberg 2020). Experts in droplet dynamics and airflow in buildings agree on this (Lewis 2020).
Therefore, all possible precautions against airborne transmission in
indoor scenarios should be taken. Precautions include increased
ventilation rate, using natural ventilation, avoiding air recirculation,
avoiding staying in another person’s direct air flow, and minimizing
the number of people sharing the same environment (Qian et al. 2018).
Of significance is maximizing natural ventilation in buildings that
are, or can be naturally ventilation and ensuring that the ventilation
rate is sufficiently high. These precautions focus on indoor environment
of public places, where the risk of infection is greatest, due to the
possible buildup of the airborne virus-carrying droplets, the virus
likely higher stability in indoor air, and a larger density of people.
Public places include in the first instance heath care facilities: while
in many hospitals care to provide adequate ventilation is a routine
measure, this is not the case in all hospital; often not where new
patients are admitted; nursing homes, etc. Shops, offices, schools,
restaurants, cruise ships, and of course public transport, is where
ventilation practices should reviewed, and ventilation maximized. Also,
personal protective equipment (PPE), in particular masks and respirators
should be recommended, to be used in public places where density of
people is high and ventilation potentially inadequate, as they can
protect against infection others (by infected individuals) and being
infected (Huang and Morawska, 2019, Leung et al., 2020).
Precautions
can be taken only when the national bodies responsible for the control
of the outbreak acknowledge the significance of this route of
transmission and recommend appropriate actions. Currently, this is not
the case anywhere in the world. In China, where the outbreak started,
the body overseeing the prevention and control of the epidemic (the
National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China) has issued
a series of prevention and control guidelines. As of 12 March 2020, the
guidelines have been updated six times (http://www.nhc.gov.cn/jkj/s3577/202003/4856d5b0458141fa9f376853224d41d7.shtml),
reflecting some change in the Commission’s perception of the mechanisms
of the viral infection spread: from no mention of airborne transmission
at all to an admission of the possibility of this route of
transmission. However, the guidelines stopped short of accepting that
this is in fact happening, and instead stated in the latest version (7
March 2020) that airborne transmission “has not been determined”. In
Italy, which has emerged as one of the main hot spots in the world, the
distance of 1 m between people is recommended in indoor “red zones”, but
there is no mention of longer distance transport (Gazzetta Ufficiale 2020). The list of examples could go on. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC Page last reviewed: October 30, 2018) takes a broader view of viral infection spread, stating that: “Airborne
transmission over longer distances, such as from one patient room to
another has not been documented and is thought not to occur”. At the time of writing, the daily increase in the number of cases of COVID-19 in the USA is fast (WHO et al., 2020).
It
is difficult to explain why public health authorities marginalize the
significance of airborne transmission of influenza or coronaviruses, but
a possible reason is that it is difficult to directly detect the
viruses traveling in the air. Immediately after expiration, the plume
carrying the expired viral content is diluted, and as it travels in the
air carried by the air flow. In the process, the concentration of the
virus does not increase uniformly in the interior environment of the
enclosed space, but it is elevated only in the flow (if there is
adequate ventilation, which is normally the case in medical facilities
or on aircraft) (Morawska 2006).
Therefore, sampling for the presence of the virus requires knowledge of
the air flow from the infected person, and a sufficiently long sampling
period to collect enough copies of the viruses. Both these requirements
present major challenges: microbiologists collecting viral samples are
not normally experts in building flow dynamics, and practicality
prevents long sampling times that would be adequate for the sensitivity
of existing viral detection methods (Booth et al. 2005).
The
fact that there are no simple methods for detecting the virus in the
air does not mean that the viruses do not travel in the air. The
above-mentioned retrospective modeling studies explained the
transmission of SARS-CoV-1 in 2003 (Booth et al., 2005, Li et al., 2005, Olsen et al., 2003, Xiao et al., 2017;12., Yu et al., 2005).
While we do not yet have all the required data in hand, including for
example data on the patterns of infections, or specific indoor
characteristics where the infections occurred, analysis of the initial
pattern of COVID-19 spread in China reveals multiple cases of
non-contact transmission, especially in areas outside Wuhan, such as
those in Hunan and Tianjin. On numerous cruise ships where thousands of
people onboard were infected, many of the infections occurred after the
imposition of isolation that confined passengers for the majority of
time to their cabins, and limited direct contact, and with hand hygiene
carefully obeyed. Was it therefore the ventilation system that spread
the airborne virus between the cabins one of the reasons for the
infections? There are also hypothesis, that airborne transmission was at
least partially responsible for a larger number of infections during a
choir, where 45 out of 60 choir members were infected (Read 2020).
Despite
the evidence and strong hypotheses, the world appears to be locked in
the old way of thinking that only direct contact matters in viral
infection spread. It is disconcerting that with all the experience and
evidence currently available, when faced with a new viral outbreak of
COVID-19, the authorities still fail to acknowledge the airborne pathway
of transmission, although many experts in China and other countries
have had experience in dealing with SARS.
We predict
that this failure to immediately recognize and acknowledge the
importance of airborne transmission and to take adequate actions against
it will result in additional cases of infection in the coming weeks and
months, which would not occur if these actions were taken. The air
transmission issue should be taken seriously now, during the course of
the epidemic. When the epidemic is over and retrospective data
demonstrates the importance of airborne transmission it will be too
late. Further, the lessons learnt now will prepare us better for when
the next epidemic strikes.
To summarize, based on the
trend in the increase of infections, and understanding the basic science
of viral infection spread, we strongly believe that the virus is likely
to be spreading through the air. If this is the case, it will take at
least several months for this to be confirmed by science. This is
valuable time lost that could be used to properly control the epidemic
by the measures outlined above and prevent more infections and loss of
life. Therefore, we plead that the international and national
authorities acknowledge the reality that the virus spreads through air,
and recommend that adequate control measures, as discussed above be
implemented to prevent further spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
Acknowledgments
The
authors would like to thank Ms. Chantal Labbe for her assistance in
literature search, drawing the figure and formatting the text. This work
was supported by the Australia-China China for Air Quality Science and
Management (ACC-AQSM). The authors confirm that no funding was received
for this work and that Prof Morawska and Prof Cao both contributed
equality to the paper. The authors declare that there are no competing
interests.
References
Source
Additional:
http://stgeorgewest.blogspot.com/2015/08/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation.html
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